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NOTE AND COMMENT 187
INSURANCE POLIcnES AS AssmTS iN BANKRUTcY.-The 
Supreme Court of
the United States, in the recent case of Cohen v. Samuels, 
38 Sup. Ct 36, has
put an end to a method, approved by some of the lower 
Federal Courts, where-
by a person could create a fund which would be completely 
under his control
but which would nevertheless be protected against any 
claim on the part of
his trustee in bankruptcy. The circumstances in the 
principal case were as
follows: Samuels had taken out ordinary life insurance 
policies, with the
usual provisions as to loan and surrender values, payable 
to certain of his
relatives as beneficiaries, but 'with a provision reserving 
to Samuels the
right to change the beneficiary without the latter's 
consent. At the time
of Samuels' bankruptcy these surrender values were 
about $i,20o, and if
before that time Samuels had wished to realize on 
such surrender values,
all that he need have done was to name himself as 
beneficiary and thus be-
come entitled to the amount. He became bankrupt, and 
now insists that the
policies do not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy as assets 
because, not being
payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, 
they do not fall
within the language of § 7o, which defines what property 
shall pass to the
trustee. And his claim was apparently so well fortified 
by authority that the
District Court for the Southern District of New York 
felt impelled to uphold
it, and was supported by the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Second Cir-
cuit, where, however, HouGH, C. J., registered a vigorous dissent.
The difficulty arises from the language of § 7o, which provides 
that the
trustee shall be vested with the title of the bankrupt to 
various classes of
property, including "* * * (3) powers which he 
might have exercised for
his own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised 
for some other
person; * * * (5) property which prior to the filing of the 
petition he could
by any means have transferred or which might have been 
levied upon and
sold under judicial process against him: Provided, That when 
any bankrupt
shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender 
value payable to
himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may, 
within thirty days
after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated 
to the trustee
by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee 
the sum so
ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own and carry 
such policy free
from the claims of the creditors, * * * otherwise the policy shall 
pass to the
trustee as assets; * * *" In the earlier years of the administration 
of the
BAYRu rcY AcT there was considerable doubt as to 
the precise effect of this
proviso as to life-insurance policies. Some courts took the 
view that such
-policies passed to the trustee as property which the bankrupt 
"could by any
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means have transferred" except that he might retain those having a sur-
render value by paying this value to the trustee; under this view it is clear
that the trustee would be entitled to a policy like those under consideration,
because it could have been transferred by the bankrupt. Other courts took
the view that no policies passed to the trustee except those having a sur-
render value, and they only to the extent of that value. The latter view was
finally adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Burlinghan v.
Crouse, 228 U. S. 459 and Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474, though in the
earlier case of Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U. S. 2o2, there is some indication
that the court at that time inclined toward the former view.
In his opinion in Burlinghan v. Crouse, Mr. Justice DAY used the words:
"We think it was the purpose of Congress to pass to the trustee that sum
which was available to the bankrupt at the time of bankruptcy as a cash
asset * * *" And those words have frequently been construed as a limitation
on the interest which the trustee can obtain. In RnmIiNGT N, BANKRUPTCY,
§ ioo2, for instance, the rule is expressed as follows: "The trustee is entitled
to the cash surrender value, and only to the cash surrender value that would
have been obtainable from the insurance company at the date of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, upon all policies on the bankrupt's life that are not
exempt by state law and that are payable to the bankrupt, his estate or personal
representative." Practically the same proposition is stated in CoLMR, BANK-
RUPTCY, (IIth Ed.) ii39. Such a limitation, restricting the trustee's right
to the cash surrender value payable at the time of the fling of the petition,
and to policies payable to the bankrupt, was hardly necessary to the decision
of the Burlingham case, but, as is seen above, it was adopted as law by text
writers (though RZmrNGToN insisted that the contrary view was preferable)
and was followed in most of the subsequently arising cases in which the pre-
cise point was presented. In most of these cases the policy was, under state
laws, exempt from the claims of creditors, and under § 6 of the BANKRUPTCY
AcT would therefore not pass to the trustee in any event. In re Cohen, 230
Fed. 733; Frederick v. Insurance Co., 235 Fed. 639. But the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in In re Arkin, 231 Fed. 947, x46 C. C. A.
143, decided that such a policy did not pass to the trustee, and the same court
came to the same conclusion in the principal case when it was before them, in
In re Samuels, 237 Fed. 796, 151 C. C. A. 38. In both these cases the court
relied on its previous decision in In re Hammel & Co., 221 Fed. 56, 137 C.C.A.
8o, but as is clearly pointed out by HougE;, C. J., in his dissent in 237 Fed. 799,
151 C. C. A. 41, the Hammel case dealt with a policy which did not have a sur-
render value, but only a loan value. In the case of In re Bonvillain, 232 Fed.
370, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that under
the law of Louisiana such a policy would pass to the trustee, but it seems that
this case, like the somewhat similar case of Malone v. Cohn, 230 Fed. 882,
150 C. C. A. 144, is based on a misconception of the effect of § 7o as declared
in Burlinghan v. Crouse, and treats the policy as property governed by the
general language of the section, and not as a peculiar class of property gov-
erned by the proviso.
The Supreme Court of the United States, when confronted by the problem
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in the principal case, did not minimize the difficulties raised by the language
in Burlinghamn v. Crouse which seems to put a strict limitation upon the trus-
tee's rights but cut the Gordian knot by invoking clause (3) of § 7o, which
vests the trustee in bankruptcy with powers which the bankrupt could have
exercised for his own benefit. This way out of the difficulty brings about a
desirable result, though it somewhat weakens the theory that the proviso in
§ 70 is a complete, exclusive, self-contained expression of all the law as to
life-insurance policies in bankruptcy. And the court says: "Our conclusions
would be the same if 'we regarded the proviso alone", justifying its conclu-
sion by the obviously undesirable result of a contrary holding in making an
insurance policy "a shelter for valuable assets and, it might be, for fraud".
It seems clear that the Circuit Court of Appeals gave an unwarranted effect
to the decision in Burllngham v. Crouse, and that the Supreme Court has in
the principal case laid down a much more desirable rule. E. H.
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